On dynamic games with randomly arriving players

Pierre Bernhard () and Marc Deschamps
Additional contact information
Pierre Bernhard: BIOCORE team, INRIA Sophia Antipolis-Méditerranée

No 2015-13, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: We consider a dynamic game where additional players (assumed identical, even if there will be a mild departure from that hypothesis) join the game randomly according to a Bernoulli process. The problem solved here is that of computing their expected payoff as a function of time and the number of players present when they arrive, if the strategies are given. We consider both a finite horizon game and an infinite horizon, discounted game. As illustrations, we discuss some examples relating to oligopoly theory (Cournot, Stackelberg, cartel).

Keywords: Dynamic game; Bernoulli process of entry; Oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C72 D21 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-13

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