Gender-specific reference-dependent preferences in the experimental trust game

Hiromasa Takahashi (), Junyi Shen and Kazuhito Ogawa
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Hiromasa Takahashi: Hiroshima City University
Kazuhito Ogawa: Kansai University

Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, 2020, vol. 17, issue 1, No 2, 25-38

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we examine gender-specific reference-dependent preferences in a trust game experiment. Different amounts of show-up fee and one question eliciting subjects’ reference points were used to categorize subjects into three frames—the gain frame, the gain or loss frame, and the loss frame. We mainly found that (i) male subjects are risk-seeking in both the gain frame and the loss frame; (ii) women are not always more risk-averse than men; and (iii) women display other-regarding preferences only when they are in a gain frame. These results demonstrate the importance of taking gender difference and the reference-dependent preference into account together when examining individuals’ economic behaviors.

Keywords: Reference-dependent preference; Gender difference; Trust game; Risk preference; Other-regarding preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Gender-specific Reference-dependent Preferences in an Experimental Trust Game (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s40844-019-00155-z

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