Gender-specific Reference-dependent Preferences in an Experimental Trust Game

Hiromasa Takahashi, Junyi Shen and Kazuhito Ogawa ()

No DP2016-09, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: We examine gender-specific reference-dependent preferences in a trust game experiment. Different participation fees and one question eliciting subjects' reference points were used to categorize subjects into three frames: the gain frame, gain or loss frame, and loss frame. We find that (i) men are risk-seeking in both the gain and the loss frame; (ii) women are not always more risk-averse than men; and (iii) women display other-regarding preferences only when they are in the gain frame. These results demonstrate the importance of taking account of both gender differences and reference-dependent preferences when examining individuals' economic behavior.

Keywords: Reference-dependent preference; Gender difference; Trust game experiment; Risk preference; Other-regarding preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-neu, nep-soc and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2016-09.pdf First version, 2016 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Gender-specific reference-dependent preferences in the experimental trust game (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2016-09

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