Corruption, institutions and regulation

Michael Breen () and Robert Gillanders

Economics of Governance, 2012, vol. 13, issue 3, 263-285

Abstract: We analyze the effects of corruption and institutional quality on the quality of business regulation. Our key findings indicate that corruption negatively affects the quality of regulation and that general institutional quality is insignificant once corruption is controlled for. These findings hold over a number of specifications which include additional exogenous historical and geographic controls. The findings imply that policy makers can focus on curbing corruption to improve regulation, over wider institutional reform. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Keywords: Regulation; Economic policy; Institutional quality; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Working Paper: Corruption, Institutions and Regulation (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-012-0111-0

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