Corruption, Institutions and Regulation

Michael Breen () and Robert Gillanders

No 201106, Working Papers from School of Economics, University College Dublin

Abstract: We analyze the effects of corruption and institutional quality on the quality of business regulation. Our key findings indicate that corruption negatively aspects the quality of regulation and that general institutional quality is insignificant once corruption is controlled for. These findings hold over a number of specifications which include additional exogenous historical and geographic controls. The findings imply that policy-makers should focus on curbing corruption to improve regulation, over wider institutional reform.

Keywords: Business regulation; Economic policy; Institutional quality; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2011-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://hdl.handle.net/10197/6381 First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Corruption, institutions and regulation (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucn:wpaper:201106

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