Determinants of post-congressional lobbying employment

Jin-Hyuk Kim ()

Economics of Governance, 2013, vol. 14, issue 2, 107-126

Abstract: This paper studies the determinants of lobbying-employment decisions of former members of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 105th–108th Congresses. The main empirical findings indicate that there are two groups more likely to become lobbyists: members not re-elected who had more conservative voting records and held important committee assignments and longer-serving members who voluntarily retired and voted less conservatively in their last term compared to their previous terms in office. A decomposition analysis confirms that the revolving doors for the two groups of legislators differ because of differences in employer response rather than in legislator characteristics. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Keywords: Revolving doors; Lobbying; Post-employment restrictions; U.S. Congress; D72; J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Determinants of Post-congressional Lobbying Employment (2012)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-013-0122-5

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