Determinants of Post-congressional Lobbying Employment

Jin-Hyuk Kim ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies the determinants of lobbying-employment decisions of former members of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 105th–108thCongresses. The main empirical findings indicate that there are two groups more likely to become lobbyists: members not re-elected who had more conservative voting records and held important committee assignments and longer-serving members who voluntarily retired and voted less conservatively in their last term compared to their previous terms in office. A decomposition analysis confirms that the revolving doors for the two groups of legislators differ because of differences in employer response rather than in legislator characteristics.

Keywords: Revolving doors; Lobbying; Post-employment restrictions; U.S. Congress (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05-05
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Published in Economics of Governance 14.2(2013): pp. 107-126

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Related works:
Journal Article: Determinants of post-congressional lobbying employment (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:82375

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