Progressive ambition, electoral selection, and the creation of ideologues

Joseph Harrington ()

Economics of Governance, 2000, vol. 1, issue 1, 13-23

Abstract: The process by which high-level office-holders are selected is shown to result in pure office-seeking politicians looking like ideologues. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Keywords: Key words:Electoral competition; political ambition; ideologues; JEL classification:D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Working Paper: Progressive Ambition Electoral Selection and the Creation of Ideologues (2000)
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