Progressive Ambition Electoral Selection and the Creation of Ideologues

Joseph Harrington ()

Economics Working Paper Archive from The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics

Abstract: The process by which high-level office-holder are selected is shown to result in pure office-seeking politicians looking like ideologues

Date: 2000
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Journal Article: Progressive ambition, electoral selection, and the creation of ideologues (2000)
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