Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility

Günther Schulze and Björn Frank

Economics of Governance, 2003, vol. 4, issue 2, 143-160

Abstract: This paper reports on an experiment of corruption that was conducted in two treatments: one with the possibility of detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the intrinsic motivation for honesty. Thus the net effect on overall corruption is a priori undetermined. We show that the salary level has an influence on corruption through increased opportunity costs of corruption, but fail to find evidence for a ‘payment satisfaction’ effect. Interesting policy conclusions emerge. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Key words: Corruption; gender; intrinsic motivation; monitoring; JEL classification: C91; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (130)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Deterrence versus Intrinsic Motivation: Experimental Evidence on the Determinants of Corruptibility (2000)
Working Paper: Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptility (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:2:p:143-160

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DOI: 10.1007/s101010200059

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