Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptility

Günther Schulze and Björn Frank

No 303, Discussion Papers, Series I from University of Konstanz, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper reports on an experiment of corruption that was conducted in two treatments: one with the possibility of detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the intrinsic motivation for honesty. Thus the net effect on overall corruption is a priori undetermined. We show that the salary level has an influence on corruption through increased opportunity costs of corruption, but fail to find evidence for a loyalty effect. Interesting policy conclusions emerge.

Keywords: corruption; gender; intrinsic motivation; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility (2003)
Working Paper: Deterrence versus Intrinsic Motivation: Experimental Evidence on the Determinants of Corruptibility (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kondp1:303

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