Preemptive behavior in sequential-move tournaments with heterogeneous agents

P.-J. Jost () and Matthias Kräkel

Economics of Governance, 2005, vol. 6, issue 3, 245-252

Abstract: Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents' strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, the first acting agent may choose a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. The principal is able to prevent preemptive behavior in equilibrium by choosing a sufficiently small spread between winner and loser prize. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Preemption; tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-004-0088-4

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