Effects of a red card on goal-scoring in World Cup football matches
Jakub Červený (),
Jan C. Ours () and
Martin A. Tuijl ()
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Jakub Červený: Tilburg University
Jan C. Ours: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Martin A. Tuijl: Tilburg University
Empirical Economics, 2018, vol. 55, issue 2, 883-903
Abstract We examine the effect of the sending-off of a player on the goal-scoring rates in FIFA World Cup matches in tournaments from 1998 to 2014. We use a hazard rate framework in which the effect of a red card is modeled as a shift in the goal-scoring rate. A red card may harm the team that receives a red card and may be beneficial for their opponent. Indeed, we find that the goal-scoring rate of the sanctioned team goes down, while the goal-scoring rate of the non-sanctioned team goes up.
Keywords: Association football; Goal-scoring; Red card; World Cup football matches (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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