Effects of a Red Card on Goal-Scoring in World Cup Football Matches
Jakub Cerveny,
Jan van Ours and
Martin A. van Tuijl ()
Additional contact information
Martin A. van Tuijl: Tilburg University
No 10174, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
We examine the effect of the sending-off of a player on the goal-scoring rates in FIFA World Cup matches in tournaments from 1998 to 2014. We use a hazard rate framework in which the effect of a red card is modeled as a shift in the goal-scoring rate. A red card may harm the team that receives a red card and may be beneficial for their opponent. Indeed, we find that the goal-scoring rate of the sanctioned team goes down, while the goal-scoring rate of the non-sanctioned team goes up.
Keywords: association football; goal-scoring; red card; World Cup football matches (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Z29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Published - published in: Empirical Economics, 2018, 55 (2), 883-903.
Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp10174.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Effects of a red card on goal-scoring in World Cup football matches (2018) 
Working Paper: Effects of a Red Card on Goal-Scoring in World Cup Football Matches (2016) 
Working Paper: Effects of a Red Card on Goal-Scoring in World Cup Football Matches (2016) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10174
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().