Overcomplying for profit

Gilles Grolleau () and Naoufel Mzoughi

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 2005, vol. 6, issue 4, 267-269

Abstract: To maximize their profit, multinationals can design and implement the same and toughest standard in all locations, regardless of domestic regulations. We discuss this kind of overcompliance and stress its underpinnings. Some potential extensions are suggested. Copyright Springer Japan 2005

Keywords: Overcompliance; Regulation; Home/host country; Standards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF03353940 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Journal Article: Overcomplying for profit (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:envpol:v:6:y:2005:i:4:p:267-269

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... mental/journal/10018

DOI: 10.1007/BF03353940

Access Statistics for this article

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies is currently edited by Ken-Ichi Akao

More articles in Environmental Economics and Policy Studies from Springer, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().