It’s a matter of confidence. Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes

Luca Bettarelli (), Michela Cella, Giovanna Iannantuoni and Elena Manzoni
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Luca Bettarelli: Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)
Michela Cella: University of Milan-Bicocca
Giovanna Iannantuoni: University of Milan-Bicocca

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2021, vol. 38, issue 2, No 12, 709-738

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we analyse the effect of constitutional structures over policy outcomes. In particular, we exploit the heterogeneity in parliamentary systems deriving from the presence and the use of the confidence vote to investigate whether stable and unstable parliamentary systems behave differently in terms of the policies they implement. This finer partition of parliamentary systems allows us to identify effects that are more robust than the ones previously discussed in the literature. We show that the difference between presidential and parliamentary systems documented in previous works is driven by a difference between presidential and stable parliamentary systems. We suggest that possible transmission channels are legislative cohesion and (the absence of) selection.

Keywords: Presidential system; Parliamentary system; Confidence vote; Government stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Related works:
Working Paper: It's a matter of confidence: Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes (2017)
Working Paper: It's a matter of confidence: Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s40888-020-00210-8

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