It’s a matter of confidence. Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes
Luca Bettarelli (),
Giovanna Iannantuoni and
Elena Manzoni ()
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Luca Bettarelli: Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)
Michela Cella: University of Milan-Bicocca
Giovanna Iannantuoni: University of Milan-Bicocca
Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2021, vol. 38, issue 2, No 12, 709-738
Abstract In this paper we analyse the effect of constitutional structures over policy outcomes. In particular, we exploit the heterogeneity in parliamentary systems deriving from the presence and the use of the confidence vote to investigate whether stable and unstable parliamentary systems behave differently in terms of the policies they implement. This finer partition of parliamentary systems allows us to identify effects that are more robust than the ones previously discussed in the literature. We show that the difference between presidential and parliamentary systems documented in previous works is driven by a difference between presidential and stable parliamentary systems. We suggest that possible transmission channels are legislative cohesion and (the absence of) selection.
Keywords: Presidential system; Parliamentary system; Confidence vote; Government stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: It's a matter of confidence: Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes (2017)
Working Paper: It's a matter of confidence: Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:epolit:v:38:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s40888-020-00210-8
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