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It's a matter of confidence: Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes

Luca Bettareli, Michela Cella, Giovanna Iannantuoni and Elena Manzoni ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we analyse the effect of constitutional structures on policy outcomes. In particular, we exploit heterogeneity in parliamentary systems deriving from the presence and the use of the confidence vote to investigate whether stable and unstable parliamentary systems behave differently in terms of the policy they implement. This finer partition of parliamentary systems allows us to identify effects that are more robust than those in the literature. We show that the difference between presidential and parliamentary systems documented in previous works is driven by a difference between presidential and stable parliamentary systems. We suggest that possible transmission channels are legislative cohesion and (the absence of) selection.

Keywords: presidential system; parliamentary system; confidence vote; government stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Date: 2017-03-08
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Related works:
Working Paper: It's a matter of confidence: Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes (2015) Downloads
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