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The influence of government ideology on corruption: the impact of the Great Recession

Héctor Bellido (), Lorena Olmos () and Juan Román-Aso ()

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2021, vol. 38, issue 2, No 11, 677-708

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies the relationship between government ideology and the level of perceived corruption, using a panel data of OECD countries covering the years 1996–2015, and the effect that the Great Recession has exerted on that relationship. We find that, before the onset of the Great Recession, governments formed by one (or more) right-wing parties are perceived as being around 1% more corrupt than those formed by one (or more) left-wing parties. We also find that misuse of public funds under coalitional governments is more likely to be perceived, that the longer the party of the current chief executive has been in office, the higher is the level of perceived corruption, and that minority governments and parties with a greater weight in the legislative chamber are also perceived as being more corrupt. However, the Great Recession has altered these relationships, increasing perceived corruption as the elections come closer, and softening or changing the impact of other political variables on perceived corruption.

Keywords: Government ideology; Corruption; Public opinion; Panel data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D72 H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s40888-020-00212-6

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