Equilibrium existence in two-player contests without absolute continuity of information

Ori Haimanko ()

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2022, vol. 10, issue 1, No 3, 27-39

Abstract: Abstract We prove the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium, without assuming absolute continuity of information, in two-player common-value contests where each player’s probability to win is continuous in efforts outside the zero-effort profile and non-decreasing in his own effort. In particular, equilibrium exists even if both players have a continuum of interdependent information types without joint density.

Keywords: Tullock contests; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Equilibrium existence; Zero-sum games; Absolute continuity of information; Continuum of types; Joint density (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-021-00215-x

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