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Economic Theory Bulletin

2013 - 2019

Current editor(s): Nicholas C. Yannelis

Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
Contact information at EDIRC.

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Volume 7, issue 2, 2019

Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences pp. 165-171 Downloads
Georgios Gerasimou
Discriminatory auctions with resale pp. 173-189 Downloads
Isa Hafalir and Musab Kurnaz
Perception, utility, and evolution pp. 191-208 Downloads
José F. Tudón M.
Monotonicity and qualified majority rules pp. 209-220 Downloads
Uuganbaatar Ninjbat
On the properties of the nucleolus of a veto game pp. 221-234 Downloads
Eric Bahel
Game-theoretic optimal portfolios in continuous time pp. 235-243 Downloads
Alex Garivaltis
Equilibria in games with weak payoff externalities pp. 245-258 Downloads
Takuya Iimura, Toshimasa Maruta and Takahiro Watanabe
Transfer paradox in a stable equilibrium pp. 259-269 Downloads
Ram Dubey and Minwook Kang
Divide-and-choose with nonmonotonic preferences pp. 271-276 Downloads
Laurence Kranich
Monotonicity in optimal mechanisms in general quasi-linear environments with a continuum of types pp. 277-290 Downloads
Yu Chen

Volume 7, issue 1, 2019

Economic and financial modeling techniques in the frequency domain pp. 1-17 Downloads
Bart Taub
Imperfect monitoring is necessary for essentiality of money pp. 19-26 Downloads
Hiroki Fukai
Optimality of the uniform rule under single-peaked preferences pp. 27-36 Downloads
Ruben Juarez and Jung S. You
On a class of smooth preferences pp. 37-57 Downloads
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Revisiting stability in one-to-one matching problems pp. 59-75 Downloads
Wouter Vergote
Reference-dependent mechanism design pp. 77-103 Downloads
Roland Eisenhuth
Equilibrium existence in global games with general payoff structures pp. 105-115 Downloads
Eric J. Hoffmann and Tarun Sabarwal
Fixed-point approaches to the proof of the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem pp. 117-124 Downloads
Jean Guillaume Forand and Metin Uyanık
Recursive maxmin preferences and rectangular priors: a simple proof pp. 125-129 Downloads
Massimiliano Amarante and Marciano Siniscalchi
Characterizing inequality benchmark incomes pp. 131-145 Downloads
Laurence S. J. Roope
Continuous utility on connected separable topological spaces pp. 147-153 Downloads
Yann Rébillé
Demand for public good as a correspondence of cost shares pp. 155-164 Downloads
A. van den Nouweland

Volume 6, issue 2, 2018

Costly state verification and truthtelling: a note on the theory of debt contracts pp. 129-139 Downloads
Josef Schosser and Jochen Wilhelm
Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution pp. 141-155 Downloads
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Jaume García-Segarra and Miguel Ginés-Vilar
Reducing the dimensionality of a selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax problem pp. 157-169 Downloads
Craig Brett and John Weymark
Initial shares can cause Pareto improvements when markets are incomplete pp. 171-181 Downloads
Egbert Dierker
The maximin equilibrium and the PBE under ambiguity pp. 183-199 Downloads
Dionysius Glycopantis and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Robust trading mechanisms with budget surplus and partial trade pp. 201-208 Downloads
Jesse A. Schwartz and Quan Wen
Deterministic versus stochastic contracts in a dynamic principal-agent model pp. 209-218 Downloads
Thomas Mettral
Egalitarianism with a dash of fair efficiency pp. 219-238 Downloads
Martin Linden
A note on interval delegation pp. 239-249 Downloads
Manuel Amador, Kyle Bagwell and Alex Frankel
A probabilistic aggregation rule for large societies pp. 251-262 Downloads
Youcef Askoura and Antoine Billot

Volume 6, issue 1, 2018

On the ultrafilter representation of coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions pp. 1-13 Downloads
Surekha Rao, Achille Basile and K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao
An agency relationship under general conditions of uncertainty: a game theory application to the doctor–patient interaction pp. 15-28 Downloads
Dionysius Glycopantis and Charitini Stavropoulou
Weak maximal elements and weak equilibria in ordinal games with applications to exchange economies pp. 29-39 Downloads
Vincenzo Scalzo
Allocation of an indivisible object on the full preference domain: axiomatic characterizations pp. 41-53 Downloads
C. Gizem Korpeoglu
Implementation with socially responsible agents pp. 55-62 Downloads
Makoto Hagiwara, Hirofumi Yamamura and Takehiko Yamato
Disclosing information to a loss-averse audience pp. 63-79 Downloads
Xingyi Liu
A theory of managerial compensation and taxation with endogenous risk pp. 81-100 Downloads
C. Gizem Korpeoglu and Stephen Spear
Perfectionism and willpower pp. 101-110 Downloads
Daniele Pennesi
A “three-sentence proof” of Hansson’s theorem pp. 111-114 Downloads
Henrik Petri
Stationary inflation and Pareto efficiency with incomplete markets and a large open economy pp. 115-128 Downloads
Matthew Hoelle

Volume 5, issue 2, 2017

Externalities in economies with endogenous sharing rules pp. 127-137 Downloads
Philippe Bich and Rida Laraki
Pre-auction or post-auction qualification? pp. 139-150 Downloads
Philippe Gillen, Vitali Gretschko and Alexander Rasch
Risky rents pp. 151-164 Downloads
Jean-Daniel Guigou, Bruno Lovat and Nicolas Treich
Dynamic programming and behavioral rules pp. 165-174 Downloads
Dale O. Stahl
Uniqueness of the weights in Harsanyi-type theorems pp. 175-178 Downloads
Massimiliano Amarante
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in Lucas’ asset pricing model when utility is unbounded pp. 179-190 Downloads
João Brogueira and Fabian Schütze
Partially dominant choice with transitive preferences pp. 191-198 Downloads
Dan Qin
Information, ambiguity and price equilibrium pp. 199-214 Downloads
R. R. Routledge
Employment lotteries, endogenous firm formation and the aspiration core pp. 215-226 Downloads
Camelia Bejan and Juan Camilo Gómez
A theory of organized crime, corruption and economic growth pp. 227-245 Downloads
Keith Blackburn, Kyriakos Neanidis and Maria Paola Rana
Assignment games with externalities revisited pp. 247-257 Downloads
Jens Gudmundsson and Helga Habis
Replica core limit theorem for economies with satiation pp. 259-270 Downloads
Hiromi Murakami and Ken Urai

Volume 5, issue 1, 2017

On the convergence of logit-response to (strict) Nash equilibria pp. 1-8 Downloads
Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Nick Netzer
A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication pp. 9-19 Downloads
Juan I. Block and David Levine
Contracts in informed-principal problems with moral hazard pp. 21-34 Downloads
Nicholas Charles Bedard
Strongly rational sets for normal-form games pp. 35-46 Downloads
Gilles Grandjean, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
Disclosure of endogenous information pp. 47-56 Downloads
Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica
A comment on mixed oligopoly spatial model: the non-uniform consumer distribution pp. 57-63 Downloads
Jie Shuai
Edgeworth box economies with multiple equilibria pp. 65-80 Downloads
Alexis Akira Toda and Kieran James Walsh
Contracts and domination in incomplete markets: what is a true core? pp. 81-108 Downloads
Valeriy Marakulin
Maximal elements of quasi upper semicontinuous preorders on compact spaces pp. 109-117 Downloads
Gianni Bosi and Magalì E. Zuanon
A remark on discontinuous games with asymmetric information and ambiguity pp. 119-126 Downloads
Wei He and Nicholas C. Yannelis
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