Economic Theory Bulletin

2013 - 2026

Current editor(s): Nicholas C. Yannelis

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Volume 11, issue 2, 2023

A canonical game—75 years in the making—showing the equivalence of matrix games and linear programming pp. 171-180

Benjamin Brooks and Philip J. Reny

On the shape of Pareto sets in Edgeworth box economies pp. 181-190

William Thomson

Is there free riding in group contests? pp. 191-201

Aner Sela

A simple characterization of the existence of upper semicontinuous order-preserving functions pp. 203-210

Gianni Bosi and Laura Franzoi

The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problems pp. 211-219

Antonio Villar

Correction: The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problems pp. 221-221

Antonio Villar

The enemy of my enemy is my friend: new conditions for network games pp. 223-233

Hideto Koizumi

Obstacles to redistribution through markets and one solution pp. 235-242

Roy Allen and John Rehbeck

Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks pp. 243-254

Xiangyu Shi

Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion pp. 255-275

Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun and Elmar Wolfstetter

Volume 11, issue 1, 2023

Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure pp. 1-25

Ken Urai, Hiromi Murakami and Weiye Chen

Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities pp. 27-44

Maria Graziano, Claudia Meo and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Stable Markov perfect equilibria in the asymmetric differential-game duopoly with a renewable resource pp. 45-63

Yuankan Huang and Takehiro Inohara

Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria: examples with continuous payoff functions pp. 65-68

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Does vertical integration increase product quality? pp. 69-80

Sanxi Li, Xinyu Li and Zhan Qu

Losses from cross-holdings in a duopoly with convex cost and strategic input price determination pp. 81-91

Arijit Mukherjee

Multivariate MRS functions and smooth preferences pp. 93-100

Norman L. Kleinberg and Barry K. Ma

Strong dictatorship via ratio-scale measurable utilities: a simpler proof pp. 101-106

Jacob M. Nebel

Endogenous gender-based discrimination in a model of simultaneous frictional labor and marriage markets pp. 107-119

Roberto Bonilla and Adrian Masters

Strategy-proofness in linear production economies with homothetic or quasi-linear preferences pp. 121-130

Wataru Ishida

Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness pp. 131-151

Michael Müller and Clemens Puppe

Directional monotone comparative statics in function spaces pp. 153-169

Uttiya Paul and Tarun Sabarwal

Volume 10, issue 2, 2022

The dual of Bertrand with homogenous products is Cournot with perfect complements pp. 183-189

Paolo Bertoletti

The minimal Hilbert basis of the Hammond order cone pp. 191-215

Ramses Abul Naga

More ambiguity aversion or more risk aversion? pp. 217-232

Jiankang Zhang

Continuity and sensitivity analysis of parameterized Nash games pp. 233-249

Zachary Feinstein

Substitution and size effect for factor demand revisited pp. 251-265

Johannes Bröcker and Till Requate

Is it reasonable to legalize tea money? pp. 267-272

Hideki Sato

Local stability constraints pp. 273-281

Esteban Peralta

Risky human capital accumulation with endogenous skill premium pp. 283-291

Karol Mazur

Revisiting the convergence theorem for competitive bidding in common value auctions pp. 293-302

Seewoo Lee and Jeong-Yoo Kim

First-mover advantage reversals under passive cross forward ownership in vertically related markets pp. 303-311

Emmanuel Petrakis and Panagiotis Skartados

‘What is important is seldom urgent and what is urgent is seldom important’: a study of the strategic implications of the urgency effect in a competitive setting pp. 313-332

Mauro Papi

Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove game pp. 333-351

Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli, Sebastian Ille and Eugenio Vicario

Volume 10, issue 1, 2022

Existence of alpha-core allocations in economies with non-ordered and discontinuous preferences pp. 1-12

Vincenzo Scalzo

The risk-neutral non-additive probability with market frictions pp. 13-25

Alain Chateauneuf and Bernard Cornet

Equilibrium existence in two-player contests without absolute continuity of information pp. 27-39

Ori Haimanko

Impact of Information Concerning the Popularity of Candidates on Loss-Averse Voters’ Abstention pp. 41-51

Kohei Daido and Tomoya Tajika

Inequality minimising subsidy and taxation pp. 53-67

Satya Chakravarty and Palash Sarkar

On the approximate purification of mixed strategies in games with infinite action sets pp. 69-93

Yuhki Hosoya and Chaowen Yu

The fractional multidimensional knapsack problem: solution and uniqueness pp. 95-103

John Zhu

Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert–Wittman model pp. 105-116

Francisco Rodríguez and Eduardo Zambrano

Auctions with resale and risk aversion pp. 117-128

Sanyyam Khurana

Agglomeration triggered by the number of regions: a NEG model with a quadratic subutility function pp. 129-145

Kensuke Ohtake

Optimal licensing contracts with a downstream oligopoly: insider versus outsider innovation pp. 147-165

Tsung-Sheng Tsai and Cheng-Tai Wu

Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity pp. 167-181

Zhiwei Liu and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Volume 9, issue 2, 2021

Fine cartels pp. 155-166

David Levine

Afriat and arbitrage pp. 167-176

Alan Beggs

Stationary equilibrium in stochastic dynamic models: Semi-Markov strategies pp. 177-194

Subir K. Chakrabarti

Demand functions and demand manifolds pp. 195-207

Alan Beggs

Evolution of conventions in games between behavioural rules pp. 209-224

Abhimanyu Khan

Wealth and income inequality in a monetary economy pp. 225-245

Yoichi Gokan and Stephen J Turnovsky

Social discount rate: spaces for agreement pp. 247-257

Takashi Hayashi and Michele Lombardi

Core equivalence in collective-choice bargaining under minimal assumptions pp. 259-267

Tomohiko Kawamori

Reduced-form mechanism design and ex post fairness constraints pp. 269-293

Erya Yang

Correction to: Reduced-form mechanism design and ex post fairness constraints pp. 295-296

Erya Yang

Designing income distributions with specified inequalities pp. 297-311

Satya Chakravarty and Palash Sarkar

Volume 9, issue 1, 2021

Fritz John’s equation in mechanism design pp. 1-5

Alfred Galichon

A simple sufficient condition for a unique and student-efficient stable matching in the college admissions problem pp. 7-9

Philip Reny

$$\lambda $$ λ envy-free pricing for impure public good pp. 11-25

Takuya Obara, Shuichi Tsugawa and Shunsuke Managi

Weak transitivity and agenda control for extended stepladder tournaments pp. 27-37

Yongjie Yang and Dinko Dimitrov

Costly force relocation in the Colonel Blotto game pp. 39-52

Brian Roberson and Oz Shy

On the insufficiency of some conditions for minimal product differentiation pp. 53-65

Kali P. Rath and Gongyun Zhao

On atom-swarming and Luce’s theorem for probabilistic beliefs pp. 67-74

Andrew Mackenzie

Can price dispersion be supported solely by information frictions? pp. 75-90

José Tudón

Comparative risk apportionment pp. 91-112

Paan Jindapon, Liqun Liu and William Neilson

On the continuity of the feasible set mapping in optimal transport pp. 113-117

Mario Ghossoub and David Saunders

Informed principal, moral hazard, and limited liability pp. 119-142

Teddy Mekonnen

Duopoly price competition with limited capacity pp. 143-154

A. Bërdëllima