Economic Theory Bulletin

2013 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nicholas C. Yannelis

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Volume 10, issue 2, 2022

The dual of Bertrand with homogenous products is Cournot with perfect complements pp. 183-189

Paolo Bertoletti

The minimal Hilbert basis of the Hammond order cone pp. 191-215

Ramses Abul Naga

More ambiguity aversion or more risk aversion? pp. 217-232

Jiankang Zhang

Continuity and sensitivity analysis of parameterized Nash games pp. 233-249

Zachary Feinstein

Substitution and size effect for factor demand revisited pp. 251-265

Johannes Bröcker and Till Requate

Is it reasonable to legalize tea money? pp. 267-272

Hideki Sato

Local stability constraints pp. 273-281

Esteban Peralta

Risky human capital accumulation with endogenous skill premium pp. 283-291

Karol Mazur

Revisiting the convergence theorem for competitive bidding in common value auctions pp. 293-302

Seewoo Lee and Jeong-Yoo Kim

First-mover advantage reversals under passive cross forward ownership in vertically related markets pp. 303-311

Emmanuel Petrakis and Panagiotis Skartados

‘What is important is seldom urgent and what is urgent is seldom important’: a study of the strategic implications of the urgency effect in a competitive setting pp. 313-332

Mauro Papi

Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove game pp. 333-351

Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli, Sebastian Ille and Eugenio Vicario

Volume 10, issue 1, 2022

Existence of alpha-core allocations in economies with non-ordered and discontinuous preferences pp. 1-12

Vincenzo Scalzo

The risk-neutral non-additive probability with market frictions pp. 13-25

Alain Chateauneuf and Bernard Cornet

Equilibrium existence in two-player contests without absolute continuity of information pp. 27-39

Ori Haimanko

Impact of Information Concerning the Popularity of Candidates on Loss-Averse Voters’ Abstention pp. 41-51

Kohei Daido and Tomoya Tajika

Inequality minimising subsidy and taxation pp. 53-67

Satya Chakravarty and Palash Sarkar

On the approximate purification of mixed strategies in games with infinite action sets pp. 69-93

Yuhki Hosoya and Chaowen Yu

The fractional multidimensional knapsack problem: solution and uniqueness pp. 95-103

John Zhu

Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert–Wittman model pp. 105-116

Francisco Rodríguez and Eduardo Zambrano

Auctions with resale and risk aversion pp. 117-128

Sanyyam Khurana

Agglomeration triggered by the number of regions: a NEG model with a quadratic subutility function pp. 129-145

Kensuke Ohtake

Optimal licensing contracts with a downstream oligopoly: insider versus outsider innovation pp. 147-165

Tsung-Sheng Tsai and Cheng-Tai Wu

Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity pp. 167-181

Zhiwei Liu and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Volume 9, issue 2, 2021

Fine cartels pp. 155-166

David K. Levine

Afriat and arbitrage pp. 167-176

Alan Beggs

Stationary equilibrium in stochastic dynamic models: Semi-Markov strategies pp. 177-194

Subir K. Chakrabarti

Demand functions and demand manifolds pp. 195-207

Alan Beggs

Evolution of conventions in games between behavioural rules pp. 209-224

Abhimanyu Khan

Wealth and income inequality in a monetary economy pp. 225-245

Yoichi Gokan and Stephen J Turnovsky

Social discount rate: spaces for agreement pp. 247-257

Takashi Hayashi and Michele Lombardi

Core equivalence in collective-choice bargaining under minimal assumptions pp. 259-267

Tomohiko Kawamori

Reduced-form mechanism design and ex post fairness constraints pp. 269-293

Erya Yang

Correction to: Reduced-form mechanism design and ex post fairness constraints pp. 295-296

Erya Yang

Designing income distributions with specified inequalities pp. 297-311

Satya Chakravarty and Palash Sarkar

Volume 9, issue 1, 2021

Fritz John’s equation in mechanism design pp. 1-5

Alfred Galichon

A simple sufficient condition for a unique and student-efficient stable matching in the college admissions problem pp. 7-9

Philip Reny

$$\lambda $$ λ envy-free pricing for impure public good pp. 11-25

Takuya Obara, Shuichi Tsugawa and Shunsuke Managi

Weak transitivity and agenda control for extended stepladder tournaments pp. 27-37

Yongjie Yang and Dinko Dimitrov

Costly force relocation in the Colonel Blotto game pp. 39-52

Brian Roberson and Oz Shy

On the insufficiency of some conditions for minimal product differentiation pp. 53-65

Kali P. Rath and Gongyun Zhao

On atom-swarming and Luce’s theorem for probabilistic beliefs pp. 67-74

Andrew Mackenzie

Can price dispersion be supported solely by information frictions? pp. 75-90

José Tudón

Comparative risk apportionment pp. 91-112

Paan Jindapon, Liqun Liu and William Neilson

On the continuity of the feasible set mapping in optimal transport pp. 113-117

Mario Ghossoub and David Saunders

Informed principal, moral hazard, and limited liability pp. 119-142

Teddy Mekonnen

Duopoly price competition with limited capacity pp. 143-154

A. Bërdëllima

Volume 8, issue 2, 2020

The Gale–Nikaido–Debreu lemma with discontinuous excess demand pp. 169-180

Bernard Cornet

Job search costs and incentives pp. 181-202

Andriy Zapechelnyuk and Ro'i Zultan

On trade in bilateral oligopolies with altruistic and spiteful agents pp. 203-218

Michele Lombardi and S. Tonin

Belief-consistent Pareto dominance pp. 219-229

Xiangyu Qu

On Machina’s paradoxes and limited attention pp. 231-244

Anastasia Burkovskaya

Hicksian complementarity and perturbed utility models pp. 245-261

Roy Allen and John Rehbeck

The extrinsic value of low-denomination money holdings pp. 263-280

Allan Hernandez-Chanto

Reduced normal forms are not extensive forms pp. 281-288

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger

On group strategyproof and optimal object allocation pp. 289-304

Conan Mukherjee

Deadlines in the market for lemons pp. 305-323

Heng Liu

Finite expected multi-utility representation pp. 325-331

Dino Borie

Continuity and robustness of Bayesian equilibria in Tullock contests pp. 333-345

Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno and Aner Sela

Optimal Gerrymandering in a competitive environment pp. 347-367

John Friedman and Richard Holden

Topologies for the continuous representability of every nontotal weakly continuous preorder pp. 369-378

Gianni Bosi and Magalì Zuanon

Volume 8, issue 1, 2020

Self-enforcing cooperation via strategic investment pp. 1-11

Herve Moulin, A. Seth and B. Taub

Two-person Bargaining with Lexicographic Preferences pp. 13-23

D. Glycopantis

Measuring gender segregation pp. 25-47

Diego C. Botassio and Rodolfo Hoffmann

Nash welfarism and the distributive implications of informational constraints pp. 49-64

Yves Sprumont

Downside risk-neutral probabilities pp. 65-77

Pierre Chaigneau and Louis Eeckhoudt

Differentiability of the value function and Euler equation in non-concave discrete-time stochastic dynamic programming pp. 79-88

Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero

Stackelberg versus Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs: primary markups, entry deterrence, and a comparison of social welfare and industry profits pp. 89-96

Jan Zouhar and Martina Zouharova

Compatibility of egalitarian equivalence and envy-freeness in a continuum-agent economy pp. 97-103

Sususmu Cato

Best-reply sets pp. 105-112

Jonathan Weinstein

A generalization of Peleg’s representation theorem on constant-sum weighted majority games pp. 113-123

Takayuki Oishi

Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism pp. 125-137

Battal Dogan and M. Bumin Yenmez

A semi-uniform-price auction for multiple objects pp. 139-148

Peyman Khezr and Flavio Menezes

On the consumer problem under an informational externality pp. 149-161

Marc Santugini

On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous ordinal and normal form games pp. 163-168

Vincenzo Scalzo