Core equivalence in collective-choice bargaining under minimal assumptions

Tomohiko Kawamori ()
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Tomohiko Kawamori: Meijo University

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2021, vol. 9, issue 2, No 8, 259-267

Abstract: Abstract We investigate a collective-choice bargaining model under minimal assumptions. In this model, the set of alternatives is arbitrary; each player’s utility function is nonnegative-valued; the decision rule is monotonic; the probability of each player’s being recognized as a proposer depends only on the tuple of actions in the previous round; any player is perfectly patient. We show that for any alternative, it is in the core if and only if there exists a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) such that it is proposed by every player and implemented with certainty.

Keywords: Collective choice; Decision rule; Core; Bargaining; Perfect patience; Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C78 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-021-00210-2

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