Economic Theory Bulletin

2013 - 2026

Current editor(s): Nicholas C. Yannelis

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Costly state verification and truthtelling: a note on the theory of debt contracts pp. 129-139: Josef Schosser and Jochen Wilhelm
Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution pp. 141-155: Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Jaume García-Segarra and Miguel Gines-Vilar
Reducing the dimensionality of a selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax problem pp. 157-169: Craig Brett and John Weymark
Initial shares can cause Pareto improvements when markets are incomplete pp. 171-181: Egbert Dierker
The maximin equilibrium and the PBE under ambiguity pp. 183-199: Dionysius Glycopantis and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Robust trading mechanisms with budget surplus and partial trade pp. 201-208: Jesse A. Schwartz and Quan Wen
Deterministic versus stochastic contracts in a dynamic principal-agent model pp. 209-218: Thomas Mettral
Egalitarianism with a dash of fair efficiency pp. 219-238: Martin Van der Linden
A note on interval delegation pp. 239-249: Manuel Amador, Kyle Bagwell and Alex Frankel
A probabilistic aggregation rule for large societies pp. 251-262: Youcef Askoura and Antoine Billot

On the ultrafilter representation of coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions pp. 1-13: Surekha Rao, Achille Basile and K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao
An agency relationship under general conditions of uncertainty: a game theory application to the doctor–patient interaction pp. 15-28: Dionysius Glycopantis and Charitini Stavropoulou
Weak maximal elements and weak equilibria in ordinal games with applications to exchange economies pp. 29-39: Vincenzo Scalzo
Allocation of an indivisible object on the full preference domain: axiomatic characterizations pp. 41-53: C. Gizem Korpeoglu
Implementation with socially responsible agents pp. 55-62: Makoto Hagiwara, Hirofumi Yamamura and Takehiko Yamato
Disclosing information to a loss-averse audience pp. 63-79: Xingyi Liu
A theory of managerial compensation and taxation with endogenous risk pp. 81-100: C. Gizem Korpeoglu and Stephen Spear
Perfectionism and willpower pp. 101-110: Daniele Pennesi
A “three-sentence proof” of Hansson’s theorem pp. 111-114: Henrik Petri
Stationary inflation and Pareto efficiency with incomplete markets and a large open economy pp. 115-128: Matthew Hoelle

Externalities in economies with endogenous sharing rules pp. 127-137: Philippe Bich and Rida Laraki
Pre-auction or post-auction qualification? pp. 139-150: Philippe Gillen, Vitali Gretschko and Alexander Rasch
Risky rents pp. 151-164: Jean-Daniel Guigou, Bruno Lovat and Nicolas Treich
Dynamic programming and behavioral rules pp. 165-174: Dale Stahl
Uniqueness of the weights in Harsanyi-type theorems pp. 175-178: Massimiliano Amarante
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in Lucas’ asset pricing model when utility is unbounded pp. 179-190: Joao Brogueira de Sousa and Fabian Schütze
Partially dominant choice with transitive preferences pp. 191-198: Dan Qin
Information, ambiguity and price equilibrium pp. 199-214: R. R. Routledge
Employment lotteries, endogenous firm formation and the aspiration core pp. 215-226: Camelia Bejan and Juan Camilo Gómez
A theory of organized crime, corruption and economic growth pp. 227-245: Keith Blackburn, Kyriakos Neanidis and Maria Paola Rana
Assignment games with externalities revisited pp. 247-257: Jens Gudmundsson and Helga Habis
Replica core limit theorem for economies with satiation pp. 259-270: Hiromi Murakami and Ken Urai

On the convergence of logit-response to (strict) Nash equilibria pp. 1-8: Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Nick Netzer
A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication pp. 9-19: Juan I. Block and David Levine
Contracts in informed-principal problems with moral hazard pp. 21-34: Nicholas Charles Bedard
Strongly rational sets for normal-form games pp. 35-46: Gilles Grandjean, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
Disclosure of endogenous information pp. 47-56: Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica
A comment on mixed oligopoly spatial model: the non-uniform consumer distribution pp. 57-63: Jie Shuai
Edgeworth box economies with multiple equilibria pp. 65-80: Alexis Akira Toda and Kieran James Walsh
Contracts and domination in incomplete markets: what is a true core? pp. 81-108: Valeriy Marakulin
Maximal elements of quasi upper semicontinuous preorders on compact spaces pp. 109-117: Gianni Bosi and Magalì E. Zuanon
A remark on discontinuous games with asymmetric information and ambiguity pp. 119-126: Wei He and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Noncooperative games, coupling constraints, and partial efficiency pp. 213-229: Sjur Didrik Flåm
Endogenous lifetime and economic growth: the roleof the tax rate pp. 247-263: Laurent Brembilla
Equilibrium existence in group contests pp. 265-276: Philip Brookins and Dmitry Ryvkin
Competition with price similarities pp. 277-290: Benjamin Bachi
A class of individual expenditure functions pp. 291-305: Martina Menon, Elisa Pagani and Federico Perali
A generalization of the AL method for fair allocation of indivisible objects pp. 307-324: Haris Aziz
Optimal performance reward, tax compliance and enforcement pp. 325-345: Christos Kotsogiannis and Konstantinos Serfes
An alternative proof of Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya’s (1929) necessary condition for majorization pp. 347-350: Oscar Volij
Separation of several convex sets pp. 351-354: Farhad Hüsseinov
An extensive form-based proof of the existence of sequential equilibrium pp. 355-365: Subir K. Chakrabarti and Iryna Topolyan
Rational expectations equilibria: existence and representation pp. 367-386: Anuj Bhowmik and Jiling Cao

Equilibrium in discontinuous games without complete or transitive preferences pp. 1-4: Philip Reny
On the existence of price equilibrium in economies with excess demand functions pp. 5-16: Guoqiang Tian
Equivalence between graph-based and sequence-based extensive form games pp. 85-94: J. Jude Kline and Shravan Luckraz
Strict Nash equilibria in non-atomic games with strict single crossing in players (or types) and actions pp. 95-109: Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli