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Equilibrium selection through $$\mathbf {p}_{u}$$ p u -dominance

Andrea Gallice ()

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2015, vol. 3, issue 1, No 6, 53-64

Abstract: Abstract The paper introduces and discusses the concept of $$\mathbf {p}_{u}$$ p u -dominance in the context of finite games in normal form. It then presents the $$\mathbf { p}_{u}$$ p u -dominance criterion for equilibrium selection. The $$\mathbf {p}_{u}$$ p u -dominance criterion is inspired by and closely related to the $$\mathbf {p}$$ p -dominance criterion originally proposed by Morris et al. (Econometrica 63:145–157, 1995). However, there are games in which the two criteria lead to different refinements. We provide sufficient conditions under which equilibrium selection through $$\mathbf {p}_{u}$$ p u -dominance is weakly finer (respectively, coarser) than equilibrium selection through $$\mathbf {p}$$ p -dominance.

Keywords: Equilibrium selection; Normal form games; $$\mathbf {p}_{u}$$ p u -Dominance; $$\mathbf {p}$$ p -Dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-015-0069-5

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