Transitive supermajority rule relations

Riste Gjorgjiev () and Dimitrios Xefteris
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Riste Gjorgjiev: University de Girona

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2015, vol. 3, issue 2, No 15, 299-312

Abstract: Abstract This paper identifies necessary and sufficient single-profile conditions for a consistent decision under a supermajority rule. It is demonstrated that a preference profile generates a transitive supermajority rule relation if and only if it is not sufficiently balanced. These conditions link transitivity of a supermajority rule to the cardinal outcomes of plurality and anti-plurality elections.

Keywords: Supermajority; Transitivity; Reduced population; $$a$$ a -balancedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0060-6

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