An extensive form-based proof of the existence of sequential equilibrium

Subir K. Chakrabarti () and Iryna Topolyan ()
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Subir K. Chakrabarti: IUPUI
Iryna Topolyan: University of Cincinnati

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2016, vol. 4, issue 2, No 17, 355-365

Abstract: Abstract We argue that an approach that relies solely on the sequential structure of a game would be useful, and provide an alternative proof of the existence of sequential equilibrium.

Keywords: Sequential equilibrium; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Sequential games; Imperfect information; Backward induction; Information sets; Consistent assessment; Beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0098-8

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