Non-bossy single object auctions

Debasis Mishra and Abdul Quadir
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Abdul Quadir: Indian Statistical Institute

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2014, vol. 2, issue 1, No 9, 93-110

Abstract: Abstract We study deterministic single object auctions in the private values environment. We show that an allocation rule is implementable (in dominant strategies) and non-bossy if and only if it is a strongly rationalizable allocation rule. With a mild continuity condition, we show that an allocation rule is implementable and non-bossy if and only if it is a simple utility maximizer (with appropriate tie-breaking). All our characterizations extend the seminal result of Roberts (“Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences”, pp. 321–348, 1979) from the unrestricted domain to the restricted domain of single object auctions.

Keywords: Single object auction; Implementation; Rationalizability; Non-bossiness; D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0031-y

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