A search model with match makers

Shigeru Makioka ()
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Shigeru Makioka: Keio University

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2015, vol. 3, issue 2, No 3, 153-168

Abstract: Abstract We study a search model in which buyers and sellers can choose between a centralized market intermediated by match makers and a decentralized market of search and matching. In this model, there is also an equilibrium in which there are no transactions in the centralized market. Such equilibrium corresponds to the situation where there are no match makers. We compare lifetime utilities of buyers and sellers when there are transactions in the centralized market with those when there are no transactions in the centralized market. We find a case of coordination failure: some buyers and sellers choose to go to the centralized market even though the existence of competitive match makers does not make any buyers and sellers better off.

Keywords: Search and match; Match maker; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0035-7

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