Noncooperative games, coupling constraints, and partial efficiency

Sjur Didrik Flåm ()
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Sjur Didrik Flåm: University of Bergen

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2016, vol. 4, issue 2, No 7, 213-229

Abstract: Abstract Many noncooperative settings require sharing of aggregate holdings—be these of natural resources, production tasks, or pollution permits. This paper considers instances where the shared items eventually become competitively priced. For that reason, the solution concept incorporates features of Nash and Walras equilibria. Focus is on how the concerned agents, by themselves, may reach an outcome of such sort. A main mechanism is direct bilateral exchange, repeated time and again.

Keywords: Coupling constraints; Normalized Nash equilibrium; Partial efficiency; Bilateral exchange; Monotonicity; Stability; Convergence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D43 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-015-0079-3

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