Economic Theory Bulletin
2013 - 2026
Current editor(s): Nicholas C. Yannelis
From:
Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().
Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.
Volume 8, issue 2, 2020
- The Gale–Nikaido–Debreu lemma with discontinuous excess demand pp. 169-180

- Bernard Cornet
- Job search costs and incentives pp. 181-202

- Andriy Zapechelnyuk and Ro'i Zultan
- On trade in bilateral oligopolies with altruistic and spiteful agents pp. 203-218

- Michele Lombardi and S. Tonin
- Belief-consistent Pareto dominance pp. 219-229

- Xiangyu Qu
- On Machina’s paradoxes and limited attention pp. 231-244

- Anastasia Burkovskaya
- Hicksian complementarity and perturbed utility models pp. 245-261

- Roy Allen and John Rehbeck
- The extrinsic value of low-denomination money holdings pp. 263-280

- Allan Hernandez-Chanto
- Reduced normal forms are not extensive forms pp. 281-288

- Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger
- On group strategyproof and optimal object allocation pp. 289-304

- Conan Mukherjee
- Deadlines in the market for lemons pp. 305-323

- Heng Liu
- Finite expected multi-utility representation pp. 325-331

- Dino Borie
- Continuity and robustness of Bayesian equilibria in Tullock contests pp. 333-345

- Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno and Aner Sela
- Optimal Gerrymandering in a competitive environment pp. 347-367

- John Friedman and Richard Holden
- Topologies for the continuous representability of every nontotal weakly continuous preorder pp. 369-378

- Gianni Bosi and Magalì Zuanon
Volume 8, issue 1, 2020
- Self-enforcing cooperation via strategic investment pp. 1-11

- Herve Moulin, A. Seth and B. Taub
- Two-person Bargaining with Lexicographic Preferences pp. 13-23

- D. Glycopantis
- Measuring gender segregation pp. 25-47

- Diego C. Botassio and Rodolfo Hoffmann
- Nash welfarism and the distributive implications of informational constraints pp. 49-64

- Yves Sprumont
- Downside risk-neutral probabilities pp. 65-77

- Pierre Chaigneau and Louis Eeckhoudt
- Differentiability of the value function and Euler equation in non-concave discrete-time stochastic dynamic programming pp. 79-88

- Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero
- Stackelberg versus Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs: primary markups, entry deterrence, and a comparison of social welfare and industry profits pp. 89-96

- Jan Zouhar and Martina Zouharova
- Compatibility of egalitarian equivalence and envy-freeness in a continuum-agent economy pp. 97-103

- Sususmu Cato
- Best-reply sets pp. 105-112

- Jonathan Weinstein
- A generalization of Peleg’s representation theorem on constant-sum weighted majority games pp. 113-123

- Takayuki Oishi
- Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism pp. 125-137

- Battal Dogan and M. Bumin Yenmez
- A semi-uniform-price auction for multiple objects pp. 139-148

- Peyman Khezr and Flavio Menezes
- On the consumer problem under an informational externality pp. 149-161

- Marc Santugini
- On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous ordinal and normal form games pp. 163-168

- Vincenzo Scalzo
Volume 7, issue 2, 2019
- Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences pp. 165-171

- Georgios Gerasimou
- Discriminatory auctions with resale pp. 173-189

- Isa Hafalir and Musab Kurnaz
- Perception, utility, and evolution pp. 191-208

- José F. Tudón M.
- Monotonicity and qualified majority rules pp. 209-220

- Uuganbaatar Ninjbat
- On the properties of the nucleolus of a veto game pp. 221-234

- Eric Bahel
- Game-theoretic optimal portfolios in continuous time pp. 235-243

- Alex Garivaltis
- Equilibria in games with weak payoff externalities pp. 245-258

- Takuya Iimura, Toshimasa Maruta and Takahiro Watanabe
- Transfer paradox in a stable equilibrium pp. 259-269

- Ram Dubey and Minwook Kang
- Divide-and-choose with nonmonotonic preferences pp. 271-276

- Laurence Kranich
- Monotonicity in optimal mechanisms in general quasi-linear environments with a continuum of types pp. 277-290

- Yu Chen
Volume 7, issue 1, 2019
- Economic and financial modeling techniques in the frequency domain pp. 1-17

- Bart Taub
- Imperfect monitoring is necessary for essentiality of money pp. 19-26

- Hiroki Fukai
- Optimality of the uniform rule under single-peaked preferences pp. 27-36

- Ruben Juarez and Jung S. You
- On a class of smooth preferences pp. 37-57

- Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
- Revisiting stability in one-to-one matching problems pp. 59-75

- Wouter Vergote
- Reference-dependent mechanism design pp. 77-103

- Roland Eisenhuth
- Equilibrium existence in global games with general payoff structures pp. 105-115

- Eric J. Hoffmann and Tarun Sabarwal
- Fixed-point approaches to the proof of the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem pp. 117-124

- Jean Guillaume Forand and Metin Uyanık
- Recursive maxmin preferences and rectangular priors: a simple proof pp. 125-129

- Massimiliano Amarante and Marciano Siniscalchi
- Characterizing inequality benchmark incomes pp. 131-145

- Laurence Roope
- Continuous utility on connected separable topological spaces pp. 147-153

- Yann Rébillé
- Demand for public good as a correspondence of cost shares pp. 155-164

- Anne van den Nouweland