Optimality of the uniform rule under single-peaked preferences

Ruben Juarez () and Jung S. You ()
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Ruben Juarez: University of Hawaii
Jung S. You: California State University, East Bay

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2019, vol. 7, issue 1, No 3, 27-36

Abstract: Abstract Consider the problem of distributing a fixed amount of a divisible resource among agents whose preferences are single-peaked. The uniform rule has been widely characterized under an ordinal utility approach. Instead, in a cardinal utility approach, we show that the uniform rule is the only consistent rule that maximizes the worst-case surplus among strategy-proof and ordinally efficient mechanisms.

Keywords: Single-peaked preferences; Strategy-proofness; Worst-case analysis; Efficiency; Uniform rule; Consistency; Divisible good; Economic surplus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0141-z

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