Fixed-point approaches to the proof of the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem

Jean Guillaume Forand and Metin Uyanık

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2019, vol. 7, issue 1, No 8, 117-124

Abstract: Abstract We provide two new proofs of the Bondareva–Shapley theorem, which states that the core of a transferable utility cooperative game has a nonempty core if and only if the game is balanced. Both proofs exploit the fixed points of self-maps of the set of imputations, applying elementary existence arguments typically associated with noncooperative games to cooperative games.

Keywords: Bondareva–Shapley theorem; Core; Fixed-point theorems; Cooperative and noncooperative game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40505-018-0146-7 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Fixed Point Approaches to the Proof of the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:etbull:v:7:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-018-0146-7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40505

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0146-7

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory Bulletin is currently edited by Nicholas C. Yannelis

More articles in Economic Theory Bulletin from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().