Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences

Georgios Gerasimou

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2019, vol. 7, issue 2, No 1, 165-171

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and incomplete preferences. The main result offers a generalization of Moulin’s (Econometrica 47:1337–1351, 1979) classic equilibrium-selection theorem in this more general environment. It is shown, in particular, that a natural extension of Moulin’s dominance solvability concept in this class of “multicriteria” games is an equilibrium refinement. It is further shown that dominance solvability based on the more permissive notion of partially dominated strategies generally fails to be an equilibrium refinement in such games.

Keywords: Dominance solvability; Vector payoffs; Incomplete preferences; Multicriteria games; Equilibrium refinement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 D10 D2 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2

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