Two-person Bargaining with Lexicographic Preferences

D. Glycopantis ()
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D. Glycopantis: University of London

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2020, vol. 8, issue 1, No 2, 13-23

Abstract: Abstract In bargaining theory a usual assumption is either that of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions or that of continuous preferences. In this note, we consider a bargaining model with lexicographic preferences for the two players. We show that the Rubinstein et al. (1992), definition can still be used to obtain a Nash solution. We also look briefly at the alternating offers approach.

Keywords: Bargaining theory; Lexicographic preferences; Nash solution; Alternating offers; Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00170-8

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