A semi-uniform-price auction for multiple objects

Peyman Khezr and Flavio Menezes

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2020, vol. 8, issue 1, No 12, 139-148

Abstract: Abstract This paper proposes a semi-uniform payment rule for selling multiple homogeneous objects. Under the proposed auction, all bidders pay a uniform price equal to the highest losing bid, except the bidder with the highest losing bid who, under some circumstances, pays the second highest losing bid. We show that bidders in this auction face an incentive, on the margin, to increase their bids vis-a-vis their bids in a uniform-price auction. This incentive is sufficient to eliminate the zero revenue equilibrium that has been identified in the multiple-object, uniform-price auction literature.

Keywords: Multi-object; Semi-uniform; Uniform-price; Auctions; D44; D82; L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40505-019-00173-5 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:etbull:v:8:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-019-00173-5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40505

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00173-5

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory Bulletin is currently edited by Nicholas C. Yannelis

More articles in Economic Theory Bulletin from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().