Compatibility of egalitarian equivalence and envy-freeness in a continuum-agent economy

Sususmu Cato ()

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2020, vol. 8, issue 1, No 8, 97-103

Abstract: Abstract The purpose of this study is to investigate a relationship between egalitarian equivalence and envy-freeness in a continuum-agent economy, where tastes vary continuously across individuals. Under efficiency, the two criteria of equity are not compatible, except in the knife-edge case. In particular, when individual utility functions are restricted to the class of Cobb–Douglas-type functions, there exists an efficient, egalitarian-equivalent, and envy-free allocation if and only if all individuals have the same taste over commodities.

Keywords: Egalitarian equivalence; Envy-freeness; Efficiency; Equal-income Walrasian allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00168-2

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