Economic Theory Bulletin

2013 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nicholas C. Yannelis

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Volume 1, issue 2, 2013

Compactness in the choice and game theories: a characterization of rationality pp. 105-110

Athanasios Andrikopoulos

A note on values for Markovian coalition processes pp. 111-122

Ulrich Faigle and Michel Grabisch

The impossibility of social evaluations of infinite streams with strict inequality aversion pp. 123-130

José Alcantud

Alternative proofs of Arrow’s general possibility theorem pp. 131-137

Sususmu Cato

An interpretation of Ellsberg’s Paradox based on information and incompleteness pp. 139-144

Luciano I. Castro and Nicholas C. Yannelis

A one-shot proof of Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem pp. 145-149

Ning Neil Yu

A characterization of maximin pp. 151-156

Kristof Bosmans and Erwin Ooghe

Liapounoff’s vector measure theorem in Banach spaces and applications to general equilibrium theory pp. 157-173

Michael Greinecker and Konrad Podczeck

An outside-option-sensitive allocation rule for networks: the kappa-value pp. 175-188

Julia Belau

A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes pp. 189-199

Ulrich Faigle and Michel Grabisch

Volume 1, issue 1, 2013

Editorial pp. 1-2

David Levine and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Incentive compatibility of rational expectations equilibrium in large economies: a counterexample pp. 3-10

Yeneng Sun, Lei Wu and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Using oriented volume to prove Sperner’s lemma pp. 11-19

Yakar Kannai

On the existence of coalition-proof Bertrand equilibrium pp. 21-31

R. R. Routledge

Eliciting beliefs by paying in chance pp. 33-37

Alvaro Sandroni and Eran Shmaya

Revealed cardinal preference pp. 39-45

József Sákovics

On seller estimates and buyer returns pp. 47-55

Alex Gershkov and Flavio Toxvaerd

Making efficient public good decisions using an augmented Ausubel auction pp. 57-68

Matthew Van Essen

The (im)possibility of collective risk measurement: Arrovian aggregation of variational preferences pp. 69-92

Frederik Herzberg

First-price auctions on general preference domains: axiomatic characterizations pp. 93-103

Tsuyoshi Adachi and Takumi Kongo