Eliciting beliefs by paying in chance

Alvaro Sandroni () and Eran Shmaya
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Alvaro Sandroni: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Eran Shmaya: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2013, vol. 1, issue 1, No 5, 33-37

Abstract: Abstract This paper describes a general principle that can be used to elicit honest opinions, even if risk attitudes are unknown.

Keywords: Scoring rule; Eliciting beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-013-0009-1

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