Ordinal dominance and risk aversion

Bulat Gafarov and Bruno Salcedo

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2015, vol. 3, issue 2, No 14, 287-298

Abstract: Abstract We find that, for sufficiently risk-averse agents, strict dominance by pure or mixed actions coincides with dominance by pure actions in the sense of (Börgers in Econometrica 61(2):423–430, 1993), which, in turn, coincides with the classical notion of strict dominance by pure actions when preferences are asymmetric. Since risk aversion is a cardinal feature, all finite single-agent choice problems with ordinal preferences admit compatible utility functions which are sufficiently risk averse as to achieve equivalence between pure and mixed dominance. This result extends to some infinite environments.

Keywords: Rationalizability; Dominance; Risk aversion; Ordinal preferences; Revealed preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0059-z

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