Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies

Yannick Viossat

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2015, vol. 3, issue 1, No 9, 113 pages

Abstract: Abstract Do evolutionary processes lead economic or biological agents to behave as if they were rational? To test this idea, many authors examined whether evolutionary game dynamics eliminate strictly dominated strategies. We survey, unify, and fill some gaps in this literature in the case of monotonic dynamics: a class of selection dynamics in which the growth rates of the pure strategies are ordered in accordance with their payoffs. We also survey results for other dynamics.

Keywords: As-if rationality; Evolutionary games; Dominated strategies; Replicator dynamics; Monotonic dynamics; Innovative dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0062-4

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