A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes

Ulrich Faigle () and Michel Grabisch

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2013, vol. 1, issue 2, No 10, 189-199

Abstract: Abstract The classical Shapley value is the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition $$N$$ N when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general coalition formation model where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain and need not finish with the grand coalition. This note provides an axiomatization which is only slightly weaker than the original one but allows a much more transparent proof. Moreover, the logical independence of the axioms is exhibited.

Keywords: Coalitional game; Coalition formation process; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40505-013-0020-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes (2013)
Working Paper: A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes (2013)
Working Paper: A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes (2013)
Working Paper: A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes (2013)
Working Paper: A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes (2013)
Working Paper: A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:etbull:v:1:y:2013:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-013-0020-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40505

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-013-0020-6

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory Bulletin is currently edited by Nicholas C. Yannelis

More articles in Economic Theory Bulletin from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().