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A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes

Ulrich Faigle () and Michel Grabisch

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Abstract: The classical Shapley value is the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition $N$ when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general coalition formation model where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain and need not finish with the grand coalition. This note provides an axiomatization which is only slightly weaker than the original one but allows a much more transparent proof. Moreover, the logical independence of the axioms is exhibited.

Keywords: Coalitional game; coalition formation process; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00976923
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Economic Theory Bulletin, 2013, pp.189-199

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Related works:
Journal Article: A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes (2013) Downloads
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