A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes

Ulrich Faigle () and Michel Grabisch

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: The Shapley value is defined as the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition N when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general model of coalition formation where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain and need not finish with the grand coalition. This note provides an axiomatization which is weaker than the one in the original paper but allows a much more transparent correctness proof. Moreover, the logical independence of the axioms is proved

Keywords: Coalitional game; coalition formation process; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2013-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2013/13052.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes (2013)
Working Paper: A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes (2013)
Working Paper: A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes (2013)
Working Paper: A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes (2013)
Working Paper: A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes (2013)
Working Paper: A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:13052

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