Ex post self-implementation

Hideki Mizukami and Takuma Wakayama

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2015, vol. 3, issue 2, No 19, 357-367

Abstract: Abstract We consider the implementation problem under incomplete information and interdependent values. This paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a social choice function to be ex post self-implementable in general environments. A social choice function is ex post self-implementable if it is fully ex post implemented by the associated direct revelation mechanism. We introduce a new monotonicity condition called restricted monotonicity and show that this and ex post incentive compatibility are necessary and sufficient for ex post self-implementation.

Keywords: Ex post implementation; Self-implementation; The direct mechanism; Ex post incentive compatibility; Restricted monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0050-8

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