On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous ordinal and normal form games

Vincenzo Scalzo ()
Additional contact information
Vincenzo Scalzo: University of Naples Federico II

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2020, vol. 8, issue 1, No 14, 163-168

Abstract: Abstract Our aim is to investigate the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the general setting of ordinal games. Using a new property, called strict condition, we identify a class of discontinuous games where there exists a unique Nash equilibrium if and only if the single deviation property is satisfied.

Keywords: Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium; Ordinal games; Discontinuous games; Strict condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40505-019-00175-3 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:etbull:v:8:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-019-00175-3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40505

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00175-3

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory Bulletin is currently edited by Nicholas C. Yannelis

More articles in Economic Theory Bulletin from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().