EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Continuity and robustness of Bayesian equilibria in Tullock contests

Ezra Einy (), Diego Moreno () and Aner Sela
Additional contact information
Ezra Einy: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2020, vol. 8, issue 2, No 12, 333-345

Abstract: Abstract We show that the Bayesian equilibrium correspondence of a Tullock contest with incomplete information is upper semicontinuous. Further, we show that when equilibrium is unique and players’ costs of effort are either state independent or uniformly bounded, then it is also lower semicontinuous, and it is robust to small perturbations of the players’ information, value for the prize, and cost of effort, as well as of the contest success function.

Keywords: Tullock contests; Incomplete information; Robustness of equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40505-020-00187-4 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: CONTINUITY AND ROBUSTNESS OF BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA IN TULLOCK CONTESTS (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Continuity and Robustness of Bayesian Equilibria in Tullock Contests (2019) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:etbull:v:8:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-020-00187-4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40505

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-020-00187-4

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory Bulletin is currently edited by Nicholas C. Yannelis

More articles in Economic Theory Bulletin from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:8:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-020-00187-4