Continuity and Robustness of Bayesian Equilibria in Tullock Contests
Ezra Einy and
Diego Moreno ()
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
We study the continuity and robustness of the Bayesian equilibria of Tullock contests with incomplete information. We show that the Bayesian equilibrium correspondence is upper semicontinuous. We identify conditions under which the Bayesian equilibrium correspondence of Tullock contests with a unique equilibrium is also lower semicontinous. Furthermore, when the Bayesian equilibrium is unique, it is robust to small perturbations of the contest's attributes (the contest success function, and the players' information, value for the prize, and cost of effort).
Keywords: Tullock; Contests; Incomplete; Information; Bayesian; Correspondence; Robustness; of; Equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: CONTINUITY AND ROBUSTNESS OF BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA IN TULLOCK CONTESTS (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:28116
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