Monotonicity and qualified majority rules

Uuganbaatar Ninjbat ()

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2019, vol. 7, issue 2, No 4, 209-220

Abstract: Abstract This paper reflects on some results characterizing qualified majority rules using monotonicity as a key axiom. In particular, some errors in the existing literature are detected and ways to fix them are proposed. Then, the role of monotonicity axiom in characterizing majority rules is analyzed. There, among other findings, we show that its marginal contribution in characterizing relative qualified majority rules is the difference between two properties called sum-invariance and sum-monotonicity. Finally, a new class of qualified majority rules where voters exercise a veto power is introduced and axiomatically characterized.

Keywords: Monotonicity; Qualified majority rule; Anonymity; Majority rule with vetoes; Qualified Pareto rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0154-7

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