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Reduced normal forms are not extensive forms

Carlos Alós-Ferrer () and Klaus Ritzberger ()
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Carlos Alós-Ferrer: University of Zurich
Klaus Ritzberger: Royal Holloway, University of London

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2020, vol. 8, issue 2, No 8, 288 pages

Abstract: Abstract Fundamental results in the theory of extensive form games have singled out the reduced normal form as the key representation of a game in terms of strategic equivalence. In a precise sense, the reduced normal form contains all strategically relevant information. This note shows that a difficulty with the concept has been overlooked so far: given a reduced normal form alone, it may be impossible to reconstruct the game’s extensive form representation.

Keywords: Reduced normal forms; Extensive form games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-020-00183-8

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