Impact of Information Concerning the Popularity of Candidates on Loss-Averse Voters’ Abstention

Kohei Daido and Tomoya Tajika

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2022, vol. 10, issue 1, No 4, 51 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this study, we build a two-candidate election model, in which voters are loss averse and face uncertainty about whether their preferred candidate is supported by a majority. Even without costs for voting, abstention may occur when voters have expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, as in Kőszegi and Rabin (Q J Econ 121:1133–1165, 2006; Am Econ Rev 97:1047–1073, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.4.1047 , 2007). We show that loss aversion leads to the equilibrium wherein abstention occurs in a large election, and the abstention rate of voters who prefer the minority candidate is higher than that of voters who prefer the majority candidate.

Keywords: Abstention; Expectations-based reference-dependent preferences; Loss aversion; Signal; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-021-00214-y

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